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Sustainability, Uncertainty, and Environmental 
Ethics 
Teresa Kwiatkowska, Wojciech Szatzschneider 
“Most people […] take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become 
good this way, behaving like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the 
things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of 
treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.” 
(Aristotle 2002, 1105b, 15) 
1 Remarks about Sustainability 
If we scan our horizon these days we detect a huge labyrinth of ecological, climatic, 
economic, and social challenges that drives us into disoriented changes at unprece-
dented speed. This myriad of swingings often without simple cause or solution has 
brought on the evolution of new concepts, including that of sustainable development 
as a basis for overcoming the environmental and economic challenges (cf. Mebratu 
1998).  
The publication of the UN-sponsored report Our Common Future (1987) opened 
the door to this ambiguous concept that became highly instrumental in developing a 
“global view” of our planet’s future. Indeed, some of the local successful outcomes 
paved the way to discussions about global policies that are thought to cope with the 
vast environmental challenges worldwide. This catch phrase has become part of many 
policy documents, ending in a wide variety of definitions and interpretations. As 
Sharachchandra M. Lele fittingly affirmed: “[Sustainable development] is a ‘metafix’ 
that will unite everybody from the profit minded industrialist and risk minimizing 
subsistence farmer to the equity seeking social worker, the pollution concerned or 
wildlife loving First Worlder, the growth maximizing policy maker, the goal-oriented 
bureaucrat and, therefore the vote-counting politician” (Lele 1991, p. 607). The flexi-
bility of the uses of this concept raises questions about its diverse meanings hidden 
behind widespread green rhetoric. 
Although the historical and conceptual antecedents of the concept of sustainability 
are well known, many practical questions have been arising. Herman Daly, challeng-
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ing the trendy and fluid nature of sustainability concept, pointed out that “this term – 
touted by many and even institutionalized in some places – is still dangerously vague” 
(Daly 1996, p. 1). Many politicians believe that their decisions concerning global envi-
ronment rely on robust and secure scientific knowledge, a voice of the natural world. 
However, there are good reasons to question our optimism about scientific knowledge 
mainly when it is applied to complex climate and environmental problems. Therefore, 
the false impression that we have a clear scientific elucidation of “sustainability” car-
ries on countless unexpected ecological, social, and economic consequences. 
Without doubt, all the definitions go around the severe environmental crisis we are 
facing and point out the necessity of clean and fair economic growth. Therefore, the 
sustainability concept has to be woven out of the rich fabric of theory and practice. 
Each of different formulations of “sustainability” makes a distinct and noteworthy 
contribution to our understanding of this notion, but also suggest that we are not really 
in position to comprehend and apply this “science” until we have recognized all dif-
ferences among various perspectives. Some authors assume that sustainable human 
society with “good quality of life for all” can be achieved by changing consumers’ 
habits and promoting “green” development programmes with appropriate technologies 
(cf. Sinha/Greenway 2004). At the same time, we face countless problems of exten-
sive floods or droughts, rising food prices followed by social unrest, deepening pov-
erty, and spreading diseases over many places of our Earth community. Hence, if the 
science of sustainability pretends to be more than a mere theoretical fanfare, it should 
avoid a partial view of one aspect of the world in highly abstract and reduced terms 
(cf. Holdrege 2008, p. 326). 
The contemporary environmental debate is mostly associated with growing pollu-
tion, dwindling natural resources and biodiversity loss. With a good reason, for his-
tory gives us mounting evidence that numerous ancient societies may have collapsed 
because of environmental degradation. Back then, however, many of the perilous 
changes have been to slow to be noticed during the individual human life. In contrast, 
in the course of the last two centuries, the economic growth and globalization have 
inevitably led us to point of various critical environmental thresholds. 
As the German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe pointed out: “If we want to 
achieve a living understanding of nature, we must follow her example and become as 
mobile and flexible as nature herself” (Goethe 1977, p. 48). Shall we adjust social and 
economic structures to natural systems, re-conceptualize the whole theory of devel-
opment, or develop an environmental “way of thinking” at the community level to 
meet basic needs of local populations? “The Romans”, wrote Martin Heidegger, 
“called a matter for discourse res […] Res publica means, not the state, but that 
which, known to everyone, contains everybody and is deliberated in public” (Heideg-
ger 1971, p. 175).  
Expert knowledge, based upon theories of science of Earth systems and space, 
will in due course generate regulatory practices of governance and the concepts of 
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sustainability that suit uniform ideals of law, justice, and society of a central state. The 
practice of dwelling within the region with its res publica characterized by a long tra-
dition rooted in customs and convention, will, on the other hand, tend to create an 
ideal of policy that emphasizes local idiosyncrasy, diversity, and look after local 
community interests. One can morally act only on policies that could be truly univer-
salized in the sense of being freely adopted by all who could be affected by them.  
2 Private Morality and Public Policy 
We have to begin by explaining the concept of morality. How can we morally con-
demn certain acts of injury to plants, animals, or ecosystems unless we are clear on 
what constitutes morality? Here we also note that moral rules exceed legal norms. 
Countless human actions may be rejected or encouraged but they cannot be part of 
any legal system. A moral rule such as Aldo Leopold’s famous pronouncement (“A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”, Leopold 1949, p. 262) is a recom-
mendation to act in a certain way, a recommendation established by experience (sci-
ence comes in handy), which has been shown to promote personal, social, and natural 
well-being better than others. And “well-being” can only imply something empirical 
like self-development, happiness, a more pleasant life, an aesthetically pleasing envi-
ronment, spiritual enjoyment, a sympathetic connection with other living things, and 
so on. Morality, as Aristotle indicates, is strictly a personal affair. It is a matter of each 
person’s independent judgments. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein once said: “Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness 
of my life arise religion, science, and art” (Wittgensten 1979, p. 79e). We can equally 
apply his thought to morality. The way we act depends on what life we would like to 
live. This is a territory where environmental ethics can play a leading role in shaping 
our values and our moral fiber into a way of understanding that preservation of nature 
is a necessary condition for developing human possibilities. But, as Aristotle rightly 
noted in Nicomachean Ethics: “[…] if arguments were in themselves enough to make 
man good, they would […] have won very great rewards […]; but as things are, […] 
they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness” (Aristotle 2002, 
1179a, 1-5). So here lurk difficulties grounded in our lives as social beings. Our val-
ues and their origins are embedded in inherited human cultural contexts. Private 
choices operate within social codes or customs. Given the fact that environmental val-
ues are rooted more in ethical discourse than in social or political practice, the protec-
tion and conservation of vulnerable biological riches requires a collective form of  
response that involves regulatory and legislative principles, and political decisions. It 
is through the government that we have to mediate human-nature relationships. It was 
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again Aristotle who pointed out that it is politics that uses the rest of sciences, and it 
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from.  
By making decisions that directly affect the anonymous public, our acts acquire 
another character. We cannot disregard this when we make a decision concerning the 
environment beyond our own back yard; we act as social or political agents, regard-
less of our deepest ethical or religious intentions. If one designs and decrees a certain 
natural area as a national park or biosphere reserve, he or she acts as a political agent, 
not as moral one. Most environmental decisions and initiatives are in large sense “ 
political” since they consist in advice as to what should be done. However, policy 
though usually based on how people behave, can also be proscriptive and normative. 
Environmental values (frugality, care, intergenerational justice, compassion, and re-
spect for nature) like all the other qualities can be thought and learned. Together with 
the experience and comprehension of the non-human world they might instill a new 
moral disposition and change old habits, and thereby traditional features of social eth-
ics and political decision-making. The new quality of culture that reflects and pro-
motes the goodness of character can, in time, convert the quality of the environment 
into the political priority. However, it is worth to remember the words of Aristotle that 
“most people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the 
sense of what is noble” (Aristotle 2002, 1179b, 35). 
At the same time, one of the most disquieting features of the more radical solu-
tions to ecological and social problems is their tendency to become authoritarian in 
the face of the pre-supposed total environmental (climatic) destruction. Such concern 
leads to proposals for “ecological guardians” to advise the sustainable society on the 
“just” or moral use of natural resources. We should not fail to remember that there are 
ways in which the coercive protection of wildlife and ecosystems ostensibly for public 
good and the intangible benefits of conservation can actually damage the environment 
and reinforce the political power of the state. The dangers of the state that thinks it 
knows what is good for us are not alien to our history, and we should be wary of this 
in environmental affairs. We must guard against telling others what their morally 
good decision ought to be, or what their “interests” are, as opposed to the interests 
they think they have. Paternalism is a vice in environmental policy.  
Various critics of contemporary policies offer visions of a free and ecological so-
ciety that can transform our relationship with each other and with the world. There are 
parallels more recently in the longing for eco-socialism or eco-communism that seem-
ingly connects the good of the humanity with the Earth Democracy. In our quest for 
the better future we should be searching for a viable alternative to the present devel-
opment models, but not for a new utopia. For whilst utopia is only a vision of a world 
without suffering, without conflict, without poverty and with justice for all, while it is 
just an intellectual or philosophical exercise, it is inoffensive and painless. When it 
becomes an instrument to convert our wishful thinking into practice, it sacrifices eve-
rything and everybody on its way to reach its goal. Wherever we look for the Earth 
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Democracy that reunites the human being with the environment, and offers the likeli-
hood for dignified life for everyone, it can not be found in projects that unleashed  
human and environmental horrors before, for they can unleash them again.  
3 What Uncertainty Are We Talking About? 
“I have praised folly, but not altogether foolishly.” 
  (Erasmus 2008, p. 7) 
At the present time most physicists are indifferent to humanistic discourse on the sub-
ject of Heisenberg’s concept. Paradoxically, philosophers, literary theorists, anthro-
pologists and many others from the social sciences have enthusiastically appropriated 
the attractive and slippery expression of uncertainty, only to confuse its real meaning 
with whatever sort of arranged fictitious connotation they found fitting. Science, they 
assumed, no different than the arts and humanities, offers us models, images, and 
metaphors of the world, and there is no reason why the layman should not make use 
of these models in his or her dealings with the world, without having to become a nu-
clear physicist to do so. In a majority of cases this kind of elucidation is, generally 
speaking, plain nonsense from the scientific point of view. While there is understand-
ing of probabilities and uncertainty in the hard sciences, particularly in mathematics 
or physics, there is little understanding of such concepts in the social sciences in spite 
of the appearance of “experts”. If we were dealing with a deterministic world, the uni-
verse stripped of randomness, the pattern of the series would reveal predictive infor-
mation. But we live in a world that is not well charted, and time gone by teaches us to 
avoid the brand of naïve empiricism that consists of learning from casual historical 
facts. The sad truth is that quite often in soft sciences people confuse science and sci-
entists, who are biased as we all are. 
Recently, an entire industry of “risk measurers” has emerged, specializing in as-
sessing risks in different scenarios. These ideas go back to the concept of Knightian 
uncertainty. In his seminal work that deals explicitly with decision-making under con-
ditions of uncertainty, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, economist Frank Knight wrote: 
“Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of 
risk, from which it has never been properly separated. […] The essential fact is that 
‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other 
times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and 
crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two is 
really present and operating […] It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ 
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proper […] is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an un-
certainty at all” (Knight 2002, p. 19). 
Much has been made of Knight’s famous distinction between “risk” and “uncer-
tainty”. In his interpretation, “risk” refers to situations where the decision-maker can 
assign mathematical probabilities to the randomness which he is faced with. In con-
trast, “uncertainty” refers to situations when this randomness cannot be expressed in 
terms of specific mathematical probabilities. (Knight’s uncertainty arises from the 
difficulty of predicting the future.) 
Knight’s distinction between uncertainty and risk is quite well preserved in classi-
cal decision theory (cf. Luce/Raiffa 1989). A decision is made under risk when the 
probability of each end result is known, and under uncertainty if the outcomes of the 
alternatives are known, but the probabilities of these outcomes are “completely un-
known or are not even meaningful” (Knight 2002, p. 13). Many economists argue that 
Knightian risk and uncertainty is one and the same thing. In particular, the distinction 
is challenged by Bayesian decision theory. Central in this theory is the idea that a sub-
jective probability, or degree of belief, can be assigned to any state of affairs. The 
Bayesian approach enters as a massive avalanche into environmental studies (cf. 
Beven 2009). However, to take full advantage of modern Bayesian statistics, these 
studies should consider losses or gains as outcomes of human actions that hardly 
could be assessed. Others assume that there are actually no probabilities out there to 
be “known” since probabilities are just individual expressions of our beliefs and have 
no connection to the blurry randomness of the “real world”. If one cannot construct a 
well-defined stochastic model, the correct quantitative parameterization is even more 
difficult. In some situation one can adjust the model to present situation but any fore-
cast of future events (in climate change, natural catastrophes, political and social 
change etc.) is clearly more elusive. “There has been a tremendous improvement in 
the three-dimensional numerical models of climate over the last two to three decades 
in terms of resolution, processes included and accuracy of simulation of present-day 
climate and variability. However, the uncertainties in the prediction of climate change 
have changed little in that time, even excluding the additional uncertainties arising 
from modelling chemical and biological processes” (Mitchell 2004, p. 2355). 
All decisions about environmental impacts generally fall into the category of deci-
sions under high risk. The solutions depend on science, engineering, logistics, and 
economic and moral assumptions about what is good and bad for humans or other life 
forms. In spite of the growing interest of the general public in nature and wildlife, it 
may be that the arguments of conservationists must be ultimately framed in cost-
benefit terms since governments will always determine their policies against the 
background of money they have to spend, and, sometimes, the priorities accepted by 
their electorates. 
Recently, some have suggested that all kinds of non-market benefits (preserving a 
species, aesthetic appreciation of forests, and scientific values of biodiversity, recrea-
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tional or spiritual pleasures) be included in cost-benefit analysis. The idea of this more 
extended kind of analysis in the environmental context is to compare the benefits 
(immediate and diffuse, monetary and non-monetary) of a decision (such as preserv-
ing wilderness, alleviating poverty and equity) to the costs (direct or potential). It has 
to be stated that a lot of policy-related research develops increasingly complex models 
that generate a never-ending debate about their applicability. We do not refer only to 
famous Schrödinger’s phrase that “nature resists imitations through models” 
(Schrödinger 1980, p. 323), but to the fact that models entries can hardly be observed 
or estimated. The use of statistics is hampered by the lack of specified knowledge 
about the ways the ecosystem works and its spatial and temporal changes. This com-
bined with scarce information about the social factors that contribute to the degrada-
tion of ecosystems make sound decision-making particularly difficult. 
Randomness does not exclude regularities in the hierarchical pattern of special 
and/or temporal variations in natural systems (cf. Kwiatkowska 2001). Stochastic 
models with time factor involved – even the most symmetric – exhibit the possibility 
of large excursions from the actual state. The simplest, most popular, and for probabil-
ity people most beautiful, continuous time and continuous paths stochastic model is 
Brownian motion that although symmetric and recurrent, can produce very large dis-
placements, positive or negative. Roughly speaking Brownian motion is characterized 
by Gaussian symmetric distribution and independent increments of past history. In 
environmental topics there is large unstructured uncertainty generated by external fac-
tors. In addition, things are complicated because the stochastic mechanism behind 
them is not autonomous, meaning that models must depend intrinsically on time fac-
tor. Any serious analysis and subsequently predictions must be given in terms of 
probability of occurrence of specific results; hence, if the model or its parameters are 
practically unknown, these predictions are fuzzy and dimmer with increasing time 
horizon. 
4 A Step towards Realistic Answer 
“Act so that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” 
  (Kant 2002, p. 429) 
“When politicians, industrialists, and environmentalists run out of practical advice, they often 
take refuge in appeals for a new vision, new values, a new commitment, and a new ethic. Such 
calls often ring hollow and rhetorical. This is the crux of the problem of sustainable development, 
and perhaps the main reason why there has been acceptance in principle, but less concrete actions 
to put into practice.” 
  (Selvam 2007, p. 6) 
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Until now, various recommendations to bring together ecologically sound ways of 
living with the call for renewing growth to alleviate poverty in the developing world 
have scarcely brought the required results. The conjecture that once the site was des-
ignated as a “nature reserve”, its biodiversity was preserved proved short-sighted. The 
shelter of its legal status did not resolve the problems of land tenures and speculation, 
or stopped the harmful agricultural activities. Furthermore, none of the proposals in-
cluding the Kyoto Protocol with its Clean Development Mechanism and permits to 
pollute is aimed at stopping deforestation. 
Environmentalists thought that a strong case can be made for conservation based 
on the local, regional, and global values of forests to be incorporated into decisions on 
“sustainable” management of this important resource. The idea was to help forest 
dwellers and rural settlers profit from the wilderness without destroying it. However, 
in many developing countries, it did not stop the destruction; selective timber harvest-
ing proved costly and inefficient. Ecologically friendly activities such as collecting 
wild fruits, rubber, nuts (non-timber products), including pharmaceutically active sub-
stances are either money-loosing propositions or push some plant species to the brink 
of extinction. Many of well meant “sustainable” programmes lost touch with the de-
velopment necessities of the communities. They focused exclusively on the alternative 
activities like industrial reforestation or intensive, multi-crop land use that may appeal 
to the healthy self-interest of the local people by providing trees and harvests of value 
to them. But they missed the real connection between the complex community prob-
lems, external market pressures and biodiversity loss. As Arturo Gómez-Pompa and 
Andrea Kaus rightly observed: “All the terracing, green mulching, selective harvest-
ing, field rotation, crop diversity, and reforesting in the world cannot help if the exter-
nal consumption of natural resources continues to outpace local sustainable practices 
and to offer economic incentives that out-compete long-term conservation benefits” 
(Gómez-Pompa/Kaus 1999, p. 5984).  
The overwhelming majority of proposals to conciliate economic progress and 
quality of life with the necessities of biological conservation have financial incentives 
attached to them. Until now disbursement of the funds public or private has often been 
insufficient or sporadic, and frequently derailed. On the one hand, the governmental 
subsidies (local and national) frequently have been bringing more harm than benefit. 
On the other hand, the international fund-lending institutions tend to promote unre-
strained development directly threatening biological, ecological, and cultural diver-
sity. The aid has also been used by power groups without changing local ideas and 
uses of the environment. Many conservation proposals have only succeeded in enor-
mous squander of money. The subsidizing agencies never visualized the complex in-
teractions between protection of biodiversity, requirements of development and the 
community life. Nor have they analyzed the direct connections between the local  
activities and the possible reduction of deforestation or other environmental pressures. 
As Alexander N. James, Kevin J. Gaston and Andrew Balmford pointed out: “Gov-
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ernments could safeguard the world’s biodiversity with a small fraction of the money 
they spend on environmentally harmful subsidies” (James et al. 1999, p. 323). 
All agree with Aldo Leopold that “system of conservation based solely on eco-
nomic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided” (Leopold 1949, p. 214), yet the question of 
financial incentives that can alleviate the poverty, and indicate the alternative to the 
environmentally damaging practices, has to be addressed promptly. According to 
some views expressed at the European Conference on the Biodiversity (2004) one of 
the main reasons of continuing biodiversity loss has been a market failure to play a 
fundamental role in halting deforestation and overall environmental degradation. 
Benefits associated with conserving biodiversity are mainly of use for the society as a 
whole and most of the time not covered by the market. Many ecosystem functions and 
services defy monetarization as their contribution to our well-being, present and  
future, is unknown or difficult to asses. Most of the non-material life support func-
tions represent “collective goods”. Intrinsic values by definition have no price, and 
many other values, as for instance unpredictable preferences of future generation,  
escape monetary evaluation. “Freely functioning markets are based on narrow self-
interest. The upstream polluter has no incentive to account for the cost he imposes on 
a downstream user of the river. The non-consideration of such ‘externalities’ – the 
third party costs – may lead to decisions that are ‘wise’ for the individual now, but 
‘unwise’ for the society as a whole (and that may also be harmful to the individual). 
This is a market failure” (Jooston/Clark 2002, p. 138). 
Conceivably, the monetary valuation can play a supportive role in environmental 
policy in spite of many objections, but its multiple practical and normative problems 
have to be considered when using such a method. However, the comprehensive  
approach to conservation of the entire biological diversity requires a strategy that goes 
beyond economic cost-benefit valuation. A number of proposals like permits to pol-
lute or transferable development rights are essentially market approaches that set lim-
its on environmentally harmful activities. However, as observed by Allen Blackman 
and Winston Harrington in reference to developing countries “tradable permits are 
generally not practical” (Blackman/Harrington 2000, p. 5). 
It is important to stress that we do not pretend to price environment by endowing 
it with market value. What we propose is the direct market out of environmental 
 improvements, always when high reliability measurement of actual state could be en-
sured: for example the number of wind turbines. The “conditional carrot” approach 
using “Principal-Agent” methodology (cf. Laffont/Martimort 2002) might be the only 
way to deal with the most serious environmental crisis. In fact, this approach has been 
already under way in combating pollution, like opening of high-occupancy vehicle 
lines or promoting hybrids. However, it poses different optimization problems be-
cause initial customer’s decision remains stable over time. 
On the whole, the Principal-Agent method (Nature being the Principal represented 
by a financial institution) aims at creating new investment opportunities that will 
210 Teresa Kwiatkowska, Wojciech Szatzschneider 
stimulate economic development of the region, benefit local communities, and the 
wildlife. Agent could be anyone who buys the certificate or, in situations involving 
reforestation, these certificates could be given free of charge to the inhabitants of a 
community. In another words, agents are people, some of them with null participation. 
Participation means the ownership of corresponding certificates. It also offers trans-
parency in handling conservation funds that will be created from taxes, or voluntary 
contributions, offsetting (compulsorily or voluntarily) environmentally harmful ac-
tions. It can be taken for granted that the main problem of any environmental decision 
is not how to impose additional taxes, but how to use the collected money wisely. The 
fund creation offers more efficient ways to improve and protect the environment than 
spending millions of dollars in organizing panels of experts who conclude (with fuzzy 
estimation of probabilities) that degradation is caused by human activities. 
A different approach with the use of Principal-Agent method has been considered 
by Laurent Franckx and Alessio D’Amato. They wrote: “We have considered there 
the regulation of a (private or public) agent by an EPA (Environmental Protection 
Agency). This EPA is constrained to basing its incentive scheme (both rewards and 
punishments) on environmental performance, and allocate funds to alternative projects 
with environmental benefits. The private agent can allocate its effort either to envi-
ronmental protection or to its core task” (Franckx/Amato 2003, p. 15). While we con-
sider only environmental improvements, we go further in co-operation topics. At the 
same time, our approach does not need precise specification of parameters, as the 
quoted above study requires. 
It is also known that rural communities in undeveloped countries mostly have a 
hierarchical structure controlled by powerful individuals. Some authors see it as a 
main reason of their failure to stop deforestation of the regions in question. According 
to our strategy their inhabitants could act positively if sufficiently rewarded. “Good” 
environmental certificates1 would recompense planting trees or decreasing pollutant 
levels. We would like to stress that our method is not aiming at valuation of environ-
mental goods nor would the proposed market lead toward this direction. 
The precise optimality of such certificates – Principal optimization problem –  
depends on the given models. After using this method for a while, we can consider 
more exact models to get precise optimality stemming from the strict application of 
the Principal-Agent method. It is worth to bear in mind that modern finance applica-
tions often anticipate theories, models, and theorems. Usual cost-benefits analysis 
compares Nash competitive equilibria with collusive ones. Well-known mismatch 
between these two (depending heavily on parameters chosen) does not have an easy 
                                                 
1 Good certificate is meant to stimulate and encourage positive environmental actions like refores-
tation, restoration, conservation of biodiversity, or reduction of pollutants. These certificates can 
be freely bought by all interested agents. 
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solution, and is linked to coalition creation and eventual renegotiation through the 
theory of repeated games (cf. Ray 2001). 
Our approach is qualitatively different. With the use of certificates of improve-
ments that could any temporal mean of some convex function of pollutants (for exam-
ple square function) we are able to create the co-operation using the concept of fusion. 
Let us explain the difference between collusive and fusion. In a collusive approach 
a certificate that pays more for smaller pollution levels embraces, let us say, two  
“domains”, for example countries, states, or local communities; each agent can make 
improvements in his or her own domain only. In the fusion case an agent can make 
improvements in the other agent’s land. This could result in the transfer of technolo-
gies or any other form of real co-operation. (In fact, recent conferences on climate 
change stress the transfer of technologies as one of the most significant parts of the 
future political agenda.) Mathematical analysis of certificates of improvement is non 
trivial (cf. Kwiatkowska/Szatzschneider 2009). The good news is that our project can 
start with the issue of ANY good environmental certificate. Instead of diffuse prom-
ises of cutting pollution that could put poor countries (if compromised) back to dark 
ages, we should consider bona fide co-operation, which can be accomplished by prop-
erly using Principal-Agent methodology.  
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